Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-2025

UN Security Council resolution 2774 (2025) on neutral stance on war in Ukraine and a swift end to the conflict!

Objective situation report: September 4, 2025 SUMMARY: China, India and Russia declared at the SCO meeting on September 1, 2025 that their cooperation is expanding as a countermeasure to US (and EU/UK) economic warfare with tariffs and sanctions. The meetings in Alaska and Washington DC on August 15 respectively 18, 2025, gave no results but divergent messages. EU/UK calls for European peacekeepers in Ukraine after peace agreement as security guarantee, but Russia likely does not accept NATO/EU troops in Ukraine.

The Ukraine war has intensified the conflict between the West and parts of the BRICS, i.e. Russia, China and India. The West is inferior in terms of manpower and industrial production capacity (1:10).

Russia's objective to prevent Ukraine from becoming member of NATO, and complete takeover of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea. If the demands are not met, for example, the non-membership in NATO, the war will likely continue with more Russian territorial demands.

Ukraine lacks defence capabilities and manpower. The Israel-Iran 12-day war was devastating for the US missile stockpile. EU/UK have not the ability to support Ukraine in a decisive way. UK/EU/NATO orders for military equipment in the US and at own industry take time, lack volume capacity, cannibalizing own military forces for fast delivery and will not determine the outcome of the war.

Russia has 1.2 million soldiers including conscripts in training. Russia has superiority in all aspects of integrated multi-domain land warfare (information, space, air, ground, sea, electronic warfare, cyber): Manpower (3:1), sensor data and intelligence (ISTAR), integrated air warfare and air missile defence (IAMD), drones, artillery, missiles, and integrated forward fire control and strike complexes. Russian conventional global/regional prompt strike capabilities able to strike against US/EU/UI

strategic assets. US/NATO IAMD not capable to shoot down manoeuvring HGV/MARVs. US/EU/UK cannot deliver materials matching Russia's industry. EU/UK deindustrialized under global transformation since 1990s. Reindustrialization and rearmament of EU/UK may take 15-30 years.

STATE OF WAR: RUSSIA IS WINNING THE WAR! ALLOWS RUSSIA TO DICTATE THE PEACE TERMS! Ukraine's offensive in 2023 destroyed their army. Ukraine's long-range strikes cannot match Russia's hammering of Ukraine's infrastructure, industry and logistics. One hundred US air-launched ERAM missiles per month will not change the imbalance, but cause Ukrainian airfields to be knocked out.

Russia estimated to have ~750,000 soldiers (~35 divisions, ~70 brigades, equivalents) in army groups against Ukraine. Fronts in Kupyansk/Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson ~650,000, and Russian-Ukrainian border ~100,000. Rotational reserve for leave within army groups ~200,000 soldiers. Additional force buildup for decisive operations. Reserve in readiness against NATO.

Ukraine's armed forces estimated at ~350,000 personnel of which the ground forces are 110 brigades with a manning rate now reported to 30% on average. Less than 250,000 soldiers stationed in the combat areas at the four Russian-annexed oblasts and in the northeast. Ukraine's reserve forces have low combat value. Ukraine's loss figures since 2022 may be higher than estimated in the table.

In the Sumy oblast and the Kharkiv oblast, Russia has taken several minor areas enabling possible coming major Russian offensives and a major encirclement of Ukrainian forces (Poltava).

Russian forces attacks Ukraine's last continuous fortified line westward in Donbas. North of Pokrovsk and west of Velyka Novosilka into Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Russia has achieved breakthroughs, where the war of attrition with forward fire control and strike complexes, and encirclement operations cutting logistics, has yielded strategic results. The encirclement and capture of Pokrovsk likely in final stages. Russian objectives probably also to capture Kostiantynivka, Siversk, Kupyansk, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, cities of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russian encirclements of Kostiantynivka, Siversk and Kupiansk likely to be completed within weeks. Kramatorsk and Sloviansk operations probably initiated. Then a possible major encirclement of all Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine (Poltava).

2024 till now Russia has advanced 6,329 km² in Ukraine. 2025 Russia has advanced 3,421 km² including Kursk at a rate highest ever since 2022. However, Russia's primary goal is to eliminate the Ukrainian fighting forces through the war of attrition. Ukraine now cannot defend the entire front.

Scenarios for Ukrainian collapse, which each constitutes basis for collapse (all now occurred):

1) Ukrainian combat units at the front give up. Units taken as POW and widespread desertion.

Estimations

WIA (wounded) ~300,000

2) Political and military leadership. Zelensky autocratic. US leadership erratic. NATO acts disunited.
3) Support from US/EU/UK ceases. NATO combat units (divisions, brigades, IAMD) cannibalized.
4) Size and quality of the Russian military and industry. Support from China and North Korea.

Estimations

Ukraine forces Aug, 2025: Russian forces Aug, 2025: Personnel Personnel 350,000 1,500,000 KIA (dead) ~250.000 KIA (dead) ~150.000 WIA (wounded) ~500,000

New warfare concepts. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance (ISTAR) from space and airborne systems. IAMD developed regarding external target data (A-50U, Mig-31BM, Su-35, Su-30) to fighters with VLRAAM (R-37M) and S-400 with active radar homing missiles (40N6E). Ukraine fighter aircrafts deep into Ukrainian territory at low level, cruise missiles and ATACMS shot down by Russia. Land battles with air support,

Russia prioritizes attrition before holding and taking terrain, as a strategic concept for total victory. Russia's war of attrition (force-centric) with larger forces and superior industrial capacity, is a stronger strategic concept than NATO's focus on short wars and manoeuvre warfare (terrain-centric). When the Ukrainian defences reach a culmination point where they have lost the capabilities to fight, Russia switches to counter-attacks or offensives.

Russia has large reserve forces that can be deployed for the occupation of large parts of Ukraine, when the Ukrainian defence forces in Donbas and along the existing battle line loses combat capability.



a) cover forward combat reconnaissance units (fire control of strike complexes), b) main combat force and c) reaction réserve, d) (a-c) supported by air strikes and artillery engagement in depth, for defence, counter-attacks and transition

to large-scale offensive (flexible defence).

2) Heavily fortified defence lines, extensive use of mines of different types.

FORTIFIED LINES DEFENSIVE – OFFENSIVE (ATTRITION)

OFFENSIVES AT UKRAINE'S WEAK DIRECTIONS

rainian strikes on Crimea may lead to Russia setting up ective to also control

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REPUBLIC

OF ADYGEA

Russian defence industry war-organized. US, EU and UK sanctions have no decisive impact. Russia has access to critical technologies and components.

artillery, missiles, strike swarming drones, rather than regular infantry assaults. Drones with IR/night vision and AI for autonomous round-the-clock attacks. Fibre optic guided FPV drones. UMPB-D-30SN, FAB-[250-3000]-UMPK stand-off precision glide bombs. Thermobaric bombs, weapons. Robotics. Russian S-500 air and missile defence systems to operational area (40N6M evolved 40N6E, 77N6 anti-ballistic missile defence, 77N6-N1 anti-satellite).

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